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ADHESION CONTRACTS: A TWENTIETH
CENTURY PROBLEM FOR A NINETEENTH
CENTURY CODE*
Nora K. Duncan**
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, legal scholars have begun to recognize that tradi-
tional principles of contractual interpretation based on the underly-
ing notions of equality of bargaining power and party autonomy are
inadequate to deal with a large number of modern commercial con-
tracts.' These anomolous contracts are called contracts of adhesion2
and are characterized by a lack of bargaining power in one of
the parties to the agreement and by the fact that they are written
entirely by one party and offered on a "take it or leave it" basis to
the other.3 Adhesion contracts are a byproduct of the growth of big
business into monopolistic enterprises focusing on mass distribution
and mass sales in the most effective way possible.4 The contracts are
drafted and presented to the public rather than to individuals. Thus,
the drafter may write the contract to his best advantage and the
adhering party has no chance to bargain.5 If the enterprise offering
the contract has little or no competition in the field or if the location
of the buyer does not present the opportunity for comparative shop-
ping, there may in fact be no choice at all for the buyer.' Although
* This article is based on the first prize student essay in the 1973-74 Civil Law
Award program of the Institute of Civil Law Studies of the Louisiana State University
Law School.
** Member of the Baton Rouge Bar.
1. Contracts of adhesion was the topic of a colloquim at the Eighth International
Congress of Comparative Law at Pescara in September 1970. Several items cited in
this article are based on reports at that conference.
2. The term "contract of adhesion" was first coined by the French civilian Ray-
mond Saleilles in DE LA D&CLARATION DE VOLONT9 229 (1901), a discussion of party
autonomy under the German Civil Code.
3. Although adhesion contracts are usually standard form contracts, the two
should be distinguished. Not all standard form contracts are contracts of adhesion
since in some cases the parties may add special clauses or alter the form. See Bolglr,
The Contract of Adhesion-A Comparison of Theory and Practice, 20 AM. J. COMP. L.
53, 54 n.2 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Bolgdr]; Wilson, Freedom of Contract and
Adhesion Contracts, 14 INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE L.Q. 172, 175-76 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Wilson].
4. Lenhoff, Contracts of Adhesion and the Freedom of Contract: A Comparative
Study in the Light of American and Foreign Law, 36 TuL. L. REV. 481 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Lenhoff].
5. Bolgar at 57.
6. Lenhoff at 482. Even if the buyer has the opportunity to do comparative shop-
ping if all suppliers of one item use the same form, he may have no effective choice.
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the problem of adhesion contracts is not a new one to the courts,' the
use of such contracts has greatly multiplied in the twentieth century.
The problem in interpreting these contracts and in determining
the rights of the parties is due to a conflict between two fundamental
principles basic to our law. One is the idea of party autonomy,8 and
the other is that the purpose of the courts is to dispense justice.' If
there has in fact been no bargaining, how can the courts apply princi-
ples of contract based on a conception of bargaining and free will of
the parties? Will the courts be "doing justice" if they enforce a clause
in an agreement which is unconscionably prejudicial to the weaker
party?
The dilemma presented by adhesion contracts needs to be care-
fully analyzed. This article will explore some of the problems and
possibilities in dealing with adhesion contracts and suggest possible
judicial and legislative approaches to equalize the bargaining posi-
tion of the parties.
I. JUDICIAL APPROACHES To ADHESION CONTRACTS' 0
Civilian Jurisdictions
In the absence of legislative provisions dealing with adhesion
contracts, the courts in civilian jurisdictions have relied on three
principles of law: contra bonos mores, good faith, and equity."
The courts in Germany have struck down contracts containing
disclaimers of liability and other harsh clauses on the theory of contra
bonos mores." To justify the refusal to enforce onerous conditions of
a contract, the courts in France and the Netherlands 3 use a codal
article that requires that contracts be performed in good faith." Civil-
7. Frequently cited cases which discuss the inequality in bargaining power of the
parties are Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sen. 125, # 28, Eng. Rep. 82 (1750),
and N.Y. Cent. R.R. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 357 (1873).
8. Bolgdr at 53.
9. Id. at 58.
10. The following discussion is intended merely to illustrate trends in judicial
interpretation rather than to fully examine the details of the multifarious judicial
doctrines and rules of construction which may have related to contracts of adhesion.
11. Not all courts in civilian jurisdictions have the same authority to interpret the
codes or dispense justice along the broad lines of equity. However, this article will not
examine that problem. See Bolgdr at 65 for a discussion of these limitations.
12. Bolgdr at 60. This theory has also been used by courts of the Netherlands.
Hondius, Standard Contracts and Adhesion Contracts According to Dutch Law, 8TH
INTL. CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, PESCARA 119 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Hondius].
13. Wilson at 179; Hondius at 122.
14. FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 1134: "Les conventions l6galement formdes tiennent
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ian application of equity varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; 5
however, the German and Dutch Courts have the authority to apply
principles of equity under the provisions of good faith or contra bonos
mores, and the courts of Switzerland have the duty to act as legisla-
tors in the absence of statutory provisions.
Common Law Jurisdictions
In the United States, early cases dealing with contracts contain-
ing disclaimer of liability clauses show that the courts first invalida-
ted such clauses in cases of gross negligence. Later, the courts used
traditional theories to strike down the clauses on the basis of absence
of knowledge, absence of consent; fundamental breach or breach of
the fundamental term," inequity,'7 or unconscionability. 8 Of these,
the theory of unconscionability was a frequently used reason for in-
validating harsh contractual provisions.'"
The extent to which the unconscionability concept was accepted
as an aid to interpretation of adhesion contracts can be illustrated by
the case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.N Although
Congress had enacted the new unconscionability provision of the Uni-
form Commercial Code2' for the District of Columbia, the contract in
question had been completed before the enactment, so the UCC did
lieu de loi A ceux qui les ont faites. Elles ne peuvent 6tre rdvoqutes que de leur
consentement mutuel, ou pour les causes que la loi authorise. Elles doivent 6tre ex~cu-
toes de bonne foi."
15. The civilian term equity is meant here, not the equity of the common law
system. For a discussion of the meaning of equity in the civil law, see Razi, Reflections
on Equity in the Civil Law Systems, 13 AM. U.L. REV. 24 (1963).
16. Wilson at 177.
17. "Inequity" here includes the doctrine of intrinsic fraud. See Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furn. Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
18. Bolgdr at 59.
19. See, e.g., Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1305 (1968).
20. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). In Williams, the defendant sold to plaintiff a
number of household items from 1957 to 1962. Each transaction had a separate con-
tract which purported to be a lease until the value had been paid in monthly install-
ments, after which ownership would pass to the buyer. Each contract stipulated that
the amount of payment made under one "lease" was inclusive of and not in addition
to other payments which might be owed by the buyer to the seller in other "lease"
agreements. It further stipulated "all payments now and hereafter made by
[purchaser] shall be credited pro rata on all outstanding leases, bills and accounts."
In 1962 plaintiff bought a stereo valued at $514.95 and soon defaulted. Defendant
sought to replevy all items sold to plaintiff since 1957 under the terms of the contract.
At the time of the last purchase, plaintiff owed $164 on previous purchases. The value
of the things purchased since 1957 was $1,800 of which plaintiff had paid $1,400.
21. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302, quoted in text at note 58 infra.
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not apply. Nevertheless, the court interpreted the contract in the
light of its unconscionability saying that:
The enactment of this section, which occurred subsequent to
the contracts here in suit, does not mean that the common law
of the District of Columbia was otherwise at the time of the
enactment, nor does it preclude the court from adopting a similar
rule in the exercise of its powers to develop the common law for
the District of Columbia."
It should be noted that in both civilian and common law jurisdic-
tions, the courts have used special rules of construction to aid in the
interpretation of adhesion contracts. 3 Thus, clauses written solely by
the offeror are strictly construed against him. Further, clauses will
not be enforced when the document does not appear to be a contract
in nature," when conditions written in fine print were not brought to
the attention of the adhering pgrty,2 and when the conditions were
not specified until after the agreement was entered into.2" It is sub-
mitted that the methods used by the courts in both civilian and
common law jurisdictions which have been cited above fail to deal
adequately with the fundamental issue of consent in adhesion con-
tracts.
Louisiana Judicial Interpretations
It is difficult to find cases dealing with adhesion contracts in
Louisiana. Thorough research has revealed no cases which discuss the
problems of adhesion per se or which follow the common law analysis
of unconscionability. Cases turning on the issue of consent are de-
void of any discussion of the elements of adhesion for the most part.
Nevertheless, there are a number of cases which deal with adhesion
indirectly or which appear to consider the inequities of one-sided
contracts.
In the case of Lawes v. New Orleans Transfer Co.28 the Louisiana
court followed the general trend toward distinguishing printed dis-
22. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furn. Co., 350 F.2d 445, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
23. Hondius at 119; Wilson at 177.
24. 10 C.J. Carriers § 179 (1917); Annot., 26 A.L.R. 1375 (1923).
25. See Comment, 63 HARV. L. REV. 495 (1950).
26. Wilson at 177.
27. See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furn. Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir 1965);
Campbell Soups Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1949); Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
28. 123 So. 144 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929). See also Marine Ins. Co. Ltd. of London
England v. Rehm, 177 So. 79 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1937).
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claimers on the back of claim checks from contracts. However, the
issue in those cases turns on whether or not a contract could be said
to have been entered into. There is no discussion of the nature of the
consent or of the relative bargaining position of the parties. That this
is a consideration can be inferred from the language used in Zimmer
v. N.Y Cent. & H.R.R. Co.2" which was cited in the Lawes case:
The difference [between acceptance of baggage or freight re-
ceipts] is very obvious in the circumstances, which, in the one
case usually admit of no negotiation, or discussion; while, in the
other, the shipment of the property is a matter of arrangement
with full opportunity for deliberate action.
The distinction between receipts and contracts has also been used in
regard to rent receipts.3 0
On the other hand, there is an entire line of cases supporting the
proposition that consent is presumed by a signature on the contract,
and the obligations contained therein cannot be avoided by the alle-
gation that the terms were not read or understood before the signing."
Typical of the language used in these cases is the following excerpt
from Ideal Loan of New Orleans, Inc. v. Johnson:32
[I]t is well established that one who signs a written instrument
or places his mark therein, is presumed to know its contents; and
he cannot avoid its obligations merely by contending that he had
not read it, or that it was not read and explained to him, or that
he did not understand its provisions.
This "presumption" is carried to such an extent, that it applies even
to persons who are illiterate,3 or who do not understand the language
in which the contract is written. 4 In addition, there are many cases
which hold that a contract is the agreement between the parties, and
the courts cannot relieve a party from a bad bargain, no matter how
29. 137 N.Y. 460, 33 N.E. 642 (1893).
30. Roppolo v. Pick, 4 So. 2d 839 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942).
31. See, e.g., Hope v. Barham, 28 F. Supp. 561 (W.D. La. 1939); Commercial
Credit Corp. v. Shipp, 220 So. 2d 735 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writs refused, 254 La. 132,
222 So. 2d 883 (1969); Ideal Loan of N.O., Inc., v. Johnson, 218 So. 2d 634 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1969); St. Landry Loan Co. v. Avie, 147 So. 2d 725 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962);
Blades v. Southern Farm Bur. Cas. Co., Inc., 95 So. 2d 209 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957),
reversed on other ground, 237 La. 1, 110 So. 2d 116 (1959).
32. 218 So. 2d 634, 635 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969).
33. Jackson v. Lemle, 35 La. Ann. 855 (1883); Housecraft Div. of So. Siding Co.
v. Jones, 120 So. 2d 662 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1960).
34. Boagni v. Fouchey, 26 La. Ann. 594 (1874); St. Landry Loan Co., Inc. v. Avie,
147 So. 2d 725 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
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harsh.35 In order to avoid the implied consent of a signature, fraud or
mistake must be shown. Perhaps the reason that there are no cases
on the issue of adhesion is that litigants are simply not pressing the
consent issue and fraud is extremely difficult to prove."
Recently, there have been a few cases in Louisiana which indi-
cate that the problem of adhesion is not completely unknown to the
courts. In Commercial Credit Corp. v. Dowdy 8 the court mentioned
that the contract in question which the plaintiff was trying to enforce
was a printed form prepared entirely by the plaintiff for the defen-
dant's signature. In that case, although the court followed the pre-
sumption that the parties knew and understood the meaning of the
contract, it said:
Appellants have made no claim of fraud or deception, and there
is nothing in the record to indicate that they did not fully under-
stand the nature of their obligation to plaintiff."9
The question which arises is whether it would have made a difference
if there was evidence in the record to indicate that the parties did not
understand the meaning of the contract.
In Servisco v. Morreale" the Louisiana federal district court
dealt with the problem of a form contract signed in blank. In that
case, an employer was suing for an injunction and damages due to a
former employee's soliciting the business of his ex-employer."1 During
the course of the employment, the employer had sent the employee
a blank form containing an agreement "by
residing at hereinafter designated as em-
ployee" not to solicit the customers of the employer for one year after
the termination of employment. The agreement had been written by
the employer; the employee had signed it without filling in the blanks
(which were subsequently filled in by the employer); and there was
no evidence that he read it or that it was read to him. In discussing
the effect of the signature, the court said:
35. See, e.g., Maloney v. Oak Builders, Inc., 256 La. 85, 235 So. 2d 386 (1970);
J.H. Jenkins Cont., Inc. v. City of Denham Springs, 216 So. 2d 549 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1968); Succession of Caine v. Tanno Land & Cattle Co., 198 So. 2d 439 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1967); Leon v. Dupre, 144 So. 2d 667 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
36. See, e.g., Hinterlang v. Usner, 215 La. 626, 41 So. 2d 455 (1949); Chemical
Cleaning, Inc. v. Brindell-Bruno, Inc., 214 So. 2d 215 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
37. An example of the difficulty of proving fraud is St. Landry Loan Co., Inc. v.
Avie, 147 So. 2d 725 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
38. 180 So. 2d 826 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1965).
39. Id. at 828.
40. 312 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. La. 1970).
41. LA. R.S. 23:921 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1962. No. 104, §§ 1, 2 did not
apply.
1086 [Vol. 34
ADHESION CONTRACTS
Morreale has limited education. The preponderance of the evi-
dence indicates that he never understood the paper he signed,
and that it was never explained to him. In this action the court's
equity power has been enlisted in an attempt to obtain a writ of
injunction. Under the circumstances it would be both inequitable
and adverse to Louisiana's policy favoring free competition to
enforce the contract's conditions against Morreale. 2
Although a federal court applying equity powers is in a different
position than a state court in Louisiana, the considerations used here
might well be applied in accordance with the Louisiana Civil Code
to support a contra bonos mores argument similar to that applied in
other civilian jurisdictions. 3
It is difficult to determine which (if any) theory Louisiana courts
might use in facing directly the problems of adhesion. There are
insurance cases which stand for the proposition that written clauses
control clauses printed on the form contract, but even that equitable
principle is limited to a situation in which the written and the printed
parts are completely irreconcilable." Without a judicial interpreta-
tion of Louisiana Civil Code article 1901, par. 3 requiring good faith
to be used in the making of a contract, that article would not be
applicable.4 5 There are some cases stating that courts will not enforce
a contract which is against public policy, but public policy in that
sense has to be very well defined (usually in a statute) .41 Since Louis-
iana has not adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, there are no
cases applying the unconscionability clause.
42. 312 F. Supp. 103, 105 (E.D. La. 1970).
43. Such a result would be reached under Louisiana Civil Code article 1892: "That
is considered as morally impossible, which is forbidden by law, or contrary to morals.
All contracts having such an object are void." See also Succession of Molaison, 213
La. 378, 34 So. 2d 897 (1948), in which a notarial act of renunciation of legitime was
annulled on the basis that the forced heir did not have sufficient experience or mental
capacity to understand the meaning of the act. Although the notary did not explain
the consequences of the act to the heir, there was no proof of fraud.
44. See, e.g., Cotton Brothers Cypress Co. v. Home, 147 La. 308, 84 So. 792 (1920);
Wallace v. Insurance Co., 4 La. 289 (1832); Brooke v. Louisiana St. Ins. Co., 4
Mart.(N.S.) 640 (La. 1826).
45. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1901: "Agreements . . . must be performed with good
faith." (Emphasis added.)
46. See Southwest Sugar & Molasses Co. v. River Term. Corp., 360 U.S. 411
(1959); Palmer v. Chamberlin, 191 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1951); Theater Time Clock, Inc.
v. Stewart, 276 F. Supp. 593 (E.D. La. 1967); Meinerz v. Traybig, 245 So. 2d 557 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1971).
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II. LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO ADHESION CONTRACTS47
Italy
Instead of facing the problem of adhesion contracts through judi-
cial interpretation, the Italian Civil Code of 1942 has specific code
articles relating to standard conditions and one-sided clauses. The
principle articles are as follows:
Article 1341-General [Standard] Conditions
General conditions, prepared by one of the parties, are bind-
ing on the other party [are incorporated into the contract] if
known by the latter at the time when the contract was concluded
or if he might have known by using ordinary diligence.
The following conditions, however, have no effect [are not
incorporated] unless specifically approved in writing:
1. Conditions limiting the liability of the party who has
prepared the general conditions, or giving said party a power to
withdraw from the contract or to suspend the execution thereof.
2. Conditions burdening the other party with time limits
for the exercise of a right or limitations to such party's power to
raise defenses, or with restrictions on freedom of contract with
third persons, or with tacit extention or renewal of the contract.
3. Clauses providing for arbitration or derogations from the
normal venue or jurisdiction of the courts."5
Article 1342-Form Contracts
In contracts made by subscribing to forms prepared for the
purpose of regulating in a uniform manner certain contractual
relationships, the clauses added to such forms prevail over the
original formulary clauses, even if incompatible, and even though
the latter have not been stricken out.
In addition, the provision of the second paragraph of the
47. The legislative enactments of Italy are provided as an example of the legisla-
tive approach of a civil law jurisdiction. No attempt has been made to find all possible
legislation affecting adhesion contracts.
48. Civ. art. 1341 (Laporta, Tamburrino 1963): "Le condizione generali di con-
tratto predisposte da uno dei contraenti sono efficaci nei confronti deil'altro, se al
momen to della conslusione del contratto questi le ha conosciute o avrebbe dovuto
conoscerle usando l'ordinaria diligenze.
"I1 ogni caso non hanno effetto, se non sono specificamente approvate per iscritto,
le condizioni che stabiliscono, a favore di colui che le ha predisposte, limitazioni di
responsabilitA, facoltA di recedere dal contratto o di sospenderne la esecuzione, zioni
alla facoltA di opporre eccezioni, restrizioni alla libertd contrattuale nei rapporti coi
terzi, tacita proroga o rinnovazione del contratto, clausole compromissorie o deroghe
alla competenze dil'autoritA giudiziaria."
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preceding article is applicable."
In 1962 Professor Gino Gorla of the University of Rome, Italy, wrote
an article analyzing the judicial interpretations of these articles in the
twenty years since their adoption and the problems involved. The
following discussion is adapted from that article in an attempt to
point out the advantages and disadvantages of such a legislative
innovation.
It should first be noted that the Italian Code distinguishes the
problems of standard conditions from one-sided clauses. Each of
these problems will be discussed separately.
The first paragraph of article 1341 indicates that the party using
the standard conditions has the burden of proof to show such facts
as notice, publicity, or that the circumstances show that a person of
ordinary diligence should have known of the conditions. In this re-
gard, general practices of the trade can be shown to indicate that the
standard conditions should have been known.' This paragraph spe-
cifically does not apply to one-sided clauses which are covered by the
second paragraph of article 1341 and must be specifically approved
in writing even if they are the general practice of the trade. The
burden of diligence on the adhering party was explained by Professor
Gorla in four basic fact situations."2
1. Standard conditions (not one-sided clauses) are in the contract
and the adhering party has the duty to read them; if he does not read
them they are still binding upon him, even if written in fine print.
2. Reference to standard conditions is clearly and expressly in the
contract although the conditions themselves are on the back or in the
margin of the contract not covered by the signature. The Italian
Court of Cassation has held that the duty on the adhering party is
the same as in number one above.
3. The contract contains reference to standard conditions contained
elsewhere than on the paper itself. No case holdings had expressly
covered this point but dicta seemed to indicate that the adhering
party would have the same burden of diligence to find and read the
conditions.
49. C. CIv. ART. 1342 (Laporta, Tamburrino 1963): "Nel contratti conclusi me-
diante la sottoscrizione di moduli o formulari, predisposti per disciplinare in maniera
uniforme determinati rapporti contrattuali, le clausoli aggiunte al modulo o al formu-
lario prevalgono see quell del modulo o del formulario qualora siano incompatibili con
esse, anche se queste ultime non sono state cancellate. Si osserva inoltre la disposizione
del secundo comma dell'articolo precedente."
50. Gorla, Standard Conditions and Form Contracts in Italian Law, 11 AM. J.
COMP. L. 1 (1962).
51. Id. at 4.
52. Id. at 5.
1974] 1089
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4. In transactions speedily entered into at a store or a counter, if
there are no one-sided clauses the adhering party is still bound to the
conditions though by definition he may have had no time to read
them. In all of the above situations, exceptions are made for misrep-
resentation and deceit. If standard conditions are such that they
could not come to the knowledge of the adhering party before the
contract was entered into, the adhering party is not bound by them
unless he expressly or tacitly accepts the conditions. 3
In regard to one-sided clauses there arose much litigation on
what was a one-sided clause, and whether the list given in article 1341
was indicative or exclusive. Although the Italian court has refused to
interpret these provisions by way of analogy, they have used "exten-
sive interpretation" to include a few situations which do not expressly
fall under the listed clauses.5" In the determination of the applicabil-
ity of the nullity of the second paragraph of article 1341, Italian courts
treat the question as one of law and do not inspect the particular facts
involved such as the relative bargaining position of the parties. The
requirement of "specific approval in writing" has been interpreted to
mean that the one-sided clauses must be specifically recalled and
approved by a separate signature from the signature for the contract
as a whole, even if the clauses are in large print in the contract.5 This
is a strict requirement of form and is true even if the adhering party
had full knowledge of the clauses. 6 This requirement is not extended
to one-sided clauses which are introduced after the making of the
contract, for example a one-sided clause contained in an invoice. In
that situation, the adhering party may enforce the contract in its
original form, but if he accepts the new condition by performing in
accordance with it, he is considered to have modified the contract and
there is no requirement for a special signature.
The disadvantages of these articles pointed out by Professor
Gorla fall into two general categories. Since the legislation is specific,
53. Id. at 9.
54. Id. at 9-10. Clauses which have been held to fall within the scope of article
1341 2 include: (1) "clauses imposing the risk of impossibility of performance on the
other party, so that the latter has to pay for performance even if he does not receive
it"; (2) "clauses which make the customer's offer irrevocable at the moment when he
signs an order subject to the approval of the offeree's home office, irrevocability in the
civil law requiring no consideration"; (3) "clauses in contracts for the sale of new cars
preventing resale within a certain period of time." Additionally, prevailing opinion
includes one-sided tacit extension or renewal clauses in leases.
55. Gorla, Standard Conditions and Form Contracts in Italian Law, 11 AM. J.
Comp. L. 1, 12 (1962).
56. Id. at 14.
57. Id. at 17.
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it has led to a great deal of litigation concerning the problems of the
formal requirements. In addition, the courts' inconsistency in strictly
interpreting the requirement of specific approval in writing, while
extending the article to include cases not directly covered by express
language, has led to confusion and uncertainty. 8
United States
The Uniform Commercial Code provided the first legislative aid
to the problem of adhesion contracts in §2-302 in the chapter on sales:
Unconscionable Contract or Clause59
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it
was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable
clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the
contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties
shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as
to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in
making the determination.
The official comment under this section sheds light on the intent and
interpretation of the unconscionability clause:'"
The basic test is whether, in the light of the general commercial
background and the commercial needs of the particular trade or
case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconsciona-
ble under the circumstances existing at the time of the making
of the contract. Subsection (2) makes it clear that it is proper for
the court to hear evidence upon these questions. The principle is
one of the prevention of oppression and unfair surprise (cf. Camp-
bell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 3d Cir. 1948) and not of
disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining
power."
It should be noted that this provision applies to commercial transac-
tions, where both the parties involved are engaged in commercial
enterprises; thus the restriction on one-sided clauses applies primar-
ily to avoid commercial oppression. This section has prompted an
58. Id. at 20.
59. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302.
60. Id., comment 1.
61. (Emphasis added.)
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extensive number of law review articles both praising and criticizing
it. 2 However, the overall response to the provision has been enthu-
siastic since it is a specific statute on which the courts can rely in
reaching equitable results.
Due to the success of the UCC provision, it was used to form a
basis for the unconscionability article of the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code § 5.108:
(1) With respect to a consumer credit sale, consumer lease,
or consumer loan, if the court as a matter of law finds the agree-
ment or any clause of the agreement to have been unconscionable
at the time it was made, the court may refuse to enforce the
agreement, or it may enforce the remainder of the agreement
without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the applica-
tion of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable
result.
(2) If it is claimed or appears to the court that the agree-
ment or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties
shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as
to its setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making the
determination.
(3) For the purpose of this section, a charge or practice
expressly permitted by this Act is not in itself unconscionable.1
3
The official comment points out the difference between this provision
and that of the UCC:
The omission of the adjective "commercial" from the provision
in subsection (2) concerning the presentation of evidence as to the
contract's "setting, purpose, and effect" is deliberate. Unlike the
UCC, this section is concerned only with transactions involving
consumers, and the relevant standard of conduct for purposes of
this section is not that which might be acceptable as between
knowledgeable merchants but rather that which measures ac-
ceptable conduct on the part of a businessman toward a con-
sumer.
6 4
62. Of particular interest if the article by Professor Leff, Unconscionability and
the Code-the Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967), in which he
criticizes the term "unconscionable" by saying that it provides no new solution to the
problem but like the Emperor's clothes, there is nothing there.
63. See also UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 4.106 (considerations to be used
in determining unconscionability in insurance contracts); Id. at § 6.111 (providing for
injunctions in cases of unconscionability).
64. Id. § 5.108, comment 1.
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The test of unconscionability in these consumer transactions is also
discussed:
The basic test is whether, in the light of the background and
setting of the market, the commercial needs of the particular
trade or case, and the condition of the particular parties to the
contract, the contract or clauses involved are so one-sided as to
be unconscionable under the circumstances existing at the time
of the making of the contract. (Emphasis added.)65
Thus it appears from this provision and official comment that in the
case of consumer transactions the relative bargaining power of the
parties is an element in determining unconscionability, contrary to
the UCC.
Louisiana
In 1972, the Louisiana legislature adopted a provision on uncon-
scionability in consumer credit transactions based on the UCCC pro-
vision. This law became effective on January 1, 1973 and reads as
follows:
With respect to a consumer credit transaction, if the court as a
matter of law finds the agreement or any clause of the agreement
to have been unconscionable at any time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the agreement, or it may enforce the re-
mainder of the agreement without the unconscionable clause, or
it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as
to avoid any unconscionable result; provided, however, for the
purposes of this chapter, an agreement, clause, charge or practice
expressly permitted by this chapter or any other law or regulation
of this state or of the United States or subdivision of either, or
an agreement, clause, charge or practice necessarily implied as
being permitted by this chapter or any other law or regulation of
this state or the United States or any subdivision of either is not
unconscionable. 6
This statute has gone into effect too recently to have any judicial
interpretation yet, and the legislative history is practically non-
existent. However, a few points should be noted about the statute. It
is presumed that since this statute follows the UCCC provision
65. Id., comment 2. The commentators edited Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furn.
Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) and Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358,
161 A.2d 69 (1960), to show prior applicability of the doctrine.
66. LA. R.S. 9:3551 (Supp. 1972).
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§5.108, the test in Louisiana for unconscionability would follow that
discussed in the official comment to UCCC §5.108. This presumption
is further supported by the tentative draft of the Louisiana Consumer
Protection Code. 7 In the comment to the section on unconscion-
ability, the reporter incorporated the same observation concerning
the test as that under UCCC §5.108. 5
This new statute adds great flexibility to Louisiana law and pro-
vides the courts with a lever to help balance the power between the
parties. Although the statute is a giant step forward, it does not go
far enough. The provision deals with consumer transactions only,
and, since Louisiana has not adopted the UCC, there is no similar
protection of merchants in a situation such as that discussed in
Campbell Soups Co. v. Wentz. Furthermore, the real issue of consent
is not attacked by this statute. There is still no uniform, logical
approach to the problems of adhesion in Louisiana.
III. A SOLUTION TO THE ADHESION DILEMMA
What should be done to ameliorate the problem of adhesion con-
tracts? It seems that the first step would be to recognize them as a
special kind of contract to which special rules must apply. In spite
of the strong inclination toward recognition of freedom of contract,
this result is dictated if the law continues to strive to mete out justice
to all persons. It should be recognized
that although liberty and equality before the law are essential to
democracy, they have not themselves any necessary connection
with economic justice, and may, where there is great economic
disparity between individuals, operate as instruments of oppres-
sion. Applied to the field of contract this [leads] to the recogni-
tion that freedom is only reasonable as a social ideal when equal-
ity of bargaining power is assumed."
It is submitted that adhesion contracts may be equitably dealt
with upon proper analysis and interpretation of the provisions of the
Louisiana Civil Code. In the twentieth century, most of the great
social changes which have taken place are exemplified in legislation
in the public law areas such as labor law, social legislation, taxation,
administrative regulation, and laws affecting public corporations."0
67. Tentative Draft of the Louisiana Consumer Protection Code, considered at the
Meeting of Council, Louisiana State Law Institute (New Orleans, Feb. 11-12, 1972).
68. Id. at p. 35.
69. Wilson at 174.
70. R. SCHLESINGER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMPARATIVE LAW 447 (1970).
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Private law, governed by the Code, has been scarcely altered by these
changes. Although the Louisiana Civil Code7 is a nineteenth century
code patterned on the Code Napoleon, it reflects the basic premises
and social values of our society. The fact that the Code was promul-
gated in the nineteenth century does not diminish the fact that it can
grow to meet social changes of the twentieth century.
Codes in the civilian tradition are general statements of the law,
statements of broad policy, statements of direction, statements
of law which are meant to have a long continuity of existence. In
some respects more similar to constitutions than to statutory
enactments, civil codes are meant to provide a basic system of
law which can acquire new life when necessary in changing time
and circumstances.7 2
If the Civil Code is to meet new challenges, it must be viewed
with twentieth century problems in mind. Solutions which were ap-
propriate for nineteenth century society will not necessarily aid in
coping with problems which were nonexistent at that time. Former
jurisprudence will not provide a basis upon which to determine an-
swers to the new problems presented; however, the fundamental legal
norms contained in the Code will. From these norms, a reasoned
approach to a new problem can be formulated.
The Nature of Consent
The essential difficulty in adhesion contracts is the notion of
consent. Louisiana courts have followed the old French principle
adhrer c'est consentir and have equated signature with consent. In
applying this rule, the courts have stressed the importance of signing
anything, saying "signatures to obligations are not mere orna-
ments. 7 3 In order to understand this jurisprudential rule, it must be
considered in the context in which it was developed. In the nineteenth
century when many people were illiterate and business was usually
conducted in face-to-face transactions, a person might sign his name
only twenty times in his entire life. In effect, a signature was only
slightly less solemn than a seal on a document. Today, an average
person could easily sign his name to various documents having some
legal significance twenty times a week. While it is necessary to have
a means to determine whether a person intends to be bound to an
71. Hereinafter called the Civil Code or simply, the Code.
72. Barham, A Renaissance of the Civilian Tradition in Louisiana, 33 LA. L. REv.
357, 369 (1973).
73. Boullt v. Sarpy, 30 La. Ann. 494, 495 (1878).
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agreement, a strict construction of signature as implying consent
regardless of the surrounding facts and circumstances hardly seems
reasonable.
The requirement in the Code is that consent is a necessary pre-
requisite to a valid agreement.74 There is no codal provision speci-
fying that a signature is prima facie proof of this consent or that a
legal presumption of consent is created by signature. However, the
Code does provide that "[tihe contract is not to be confounded with
the instrument in writing by which it is witnessed . . . ."
If there are one-sided clauses in a form contract to which a person
in his right mind would not normally consent, is it valid to presume
that his signature implies consent to every element of the agreement?
Does the presumption retain validity when it is shown that notice of
the one-sided clauses was not brought to the attention of the adhering
party or that the clauses were in fine print or that the adhering party
had no opportunity to bargain?
It has been asserted that to equate signature with consent, when
there is no opportunity to bargain and a gross inequality of the par-
ties, is tantamount to creating a juridical relation on the basis of form
alone.76 Such an effect is reminiscent of the Roman stipulatio and is
not consistent with the will theory pervading the Code. It is submit-
ted that when the circumstances of a case show that the elements of
adhesion are present, the courts ought to look to these circumstances
to determine whether consent has been given.
The Civil Code expressly provides for such a judicial determina-
tion in the following articles, quoted in pertinent part:
Article 1766: No contract is complete without the consent of
both parties ....
Article 1798: As there must be two parties to every contract,
so there must be something proposed by one and accepted and
agreed to by another to form the matter of such contract; the will
of both parties must unite on the same point. (Emphasis added.)
Article 1797: When the parties have the legal capacity to
form a contract, the next requisite to its validity is their consent.
This being a mere operation of the mind, can have no effect,
unless it be evinced in some manner that shall cause it to be
understood by the other parties to the contract. To prevent error
in this essential point, the law establishes, by certain rules
adapted to the nature of the contract, what circumstances shall
74. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1779.
75. Id. art. 1762.
76. Bolgdr at 57.
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be evidence of such consent, and how those circumstances shall
be proved; these come within the purview of the law of evidence.
(Emphasis added.)
Article 1818: Where the law does not create a legal presump-
tion of consent from certain facts, then, as in the case of other
simple presumptions, it must be left to the discretion of the
judge, whether assent is to be implied from them or not.
[Preceding articles creating various presumptions do not create
a presumption which would be applicable in adhesion contracts.]
(Emphasis added.)
A reading of these articles leads to the conclusion that a Louis-
iana judge faced with an adhesion contract must look to the nature
of the consent of the adherer to determine (1) whether the signature
on the written form connotes consent to the entire agreement, (2)
whether there has been a true meeting of the minds on all the ele-
ments of the agreement, (3) whether under the particular circumstan-
ces the adhering party shall be held to a standard of diligence in
understanding the terms of the agreement, and (4) whether consent
to one-sided clauses has been adequately expressed. To fail to look
to each of these elements in order to determine whether consent has
been given, by relying merely upon the signature, would be an abdi-
cation of the duty of the judge as provided by the Code.
Such an interpretation would not impair the obligation of con-
tracts contrary to the federal Constitution and the laws of the State
of Louisiana, because only contracts legally entered into may be en-
forced, and consent is one of the requisites for legal agreement. Like-
wise, the maxim that the contract is the law between the parties"
would not come into effect until it had been decided that there was
in fact a contract based on consent of the parties. Looking directly
to the consent issue would permit judges to reach reasonable conclu-
sions without distorting positive provisions as was done in the case
of extending the notion of good faith to the making of the contract in
France and the Netherlands."8
Before a determination can be made as to whether or not consent
exists, consent must be defined. However, the Code contains no defi-
nition of consent. German doctrinal writers have given much thought
to this issue and have determined two constituent elements:
77. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1901.
78. The codal provisions refer to the performance of the obligations, not the nego-
tiations prior to making the contract. In order to achieve the desired result, the courts,
by judicial interpolation extend the good faith requirement to both non-contractual
and pre-contractual relationships.
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Abschlussfreiheit or the freedom to enter into the contract, and
Gestaltungsfreiheit or the power to co-determine the terms.79 This
analysis goes to the heart of the adhesion contract problem. In an
adhesion contract, the adhering party has the freedom to decide
whether or not to enter into the contract, but he does not have the
power to co-determine the terms.
It is submitted that the concept of contract reflected in the Code
(including bargaining and party autonomy) incorporates both of
these elements. If this analysis were followed by a judge making a
determination of whether assent had been given, he could conclude
that there was no consent when the ability to co-determine the terms
was lacking. 0
Jurisprudential Remedies under the Code
The consent approach to adhesion contracts discussed above
gives courts a reasonable method for nullifying the entire agreement.
An equally valid method of approach to adhesion contracts in Louis-
iana could be found in the use of the contra bonos mores articles."'
As continental courts apply this doctrine, a contract containing
clauses so one-sided that they contravene a society's sense of justice
and decency is avoided because it is contrary to good morals.
Louisiana judges could use both of these approaches today to
reach just results in cases of adhesion. In looking to the issue of
adhesion itself, judges would make great advances in our contracts
law. However, neither of these methods really solves the problem of
adhesion. They are means by which the courts can relieve a party
from an unfair agreement, but there is not the flexibility to reach
anything other than an all or nothing solution. Under the Code, there
is no conception of partial enforcement. If the contract is valid, all of
it is enforced;. if it is invalid, none of it may be enforced.
A Modest Proposal
Not every adhesion problem can be justly solved by declaring the
contract wholly valid or invalid. In some cases, the best result would
be to declare a clause invalid thus upholding the essential agreement
of the parties while protecting the weaker party from unusually harsh
one-sided clauses. Statutes in Italy, a civil law jurisdiction, give spe-
79. Lenhoff at 482.
80. The exercise vel non of the power to co-determine is not important in deter-
mining whether consent exists.
81. LA. CiV. CODE art. 1892; see 1 S. LITVINOn', OBLIGATIONS § 212 n.34, § 30
(1969).
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cific authority to the judge to invalidate clauses of an agreement. It
is significant that legislatures which have undertaken the task of
correcting the inequality of bargaining power have considered the
power to invalidate clauses as essential to proper dispensation of
justice. It is submitted that this flexible remedy should be incorpo-
rated into the Civil Code.
If an amendment to the Code is called for, what should be the
nature of the amendment? The statutes enacted in Italy have the
defect of being so specific and form-oriented that they created innu-
merable problems. A flood of litigation ensued while the courts tried
to define the specific requirements of form. In contrast, the broader
provisions of the UCC and UCCC have led to more effective results
without unnecessary litigation.
The Louisian statute on unconscionability in consumer credit
transactions gives Louisiana courts the necessary flexibility to refuse
to enforce a provision of the contract. This statute has the advantage
of giving wide discretion to the court while avoiding the complica-
tions of strict requirements of form. The disadvantage of R.S. 9:3551
is that it is by its terms limited to consumer credit transactions.
Adhesion contracts are not-ised exclusively in consumer credit trans-
actions; they are pervasive in all transactions. Thus a new codal
provision is necessary to increase the scope of the remedy in keeping
with the scope of the problem.
Determinations would have to be made as to the diligence re-
quired of the adhering party in seeking to understand the terms, the
burden on the drafting party in conducting his business, and the
public interest in protecting citizens from sharp business practices.
These issues would have to be resolved in the light of the facts of each
case.
CONCLUSION
Adhesion contracts should be specifically analyzed as a pervasive
type of contract in modem society. A unified, conceptual approach
to the problems of adhesion provides a better framework for reaching
solutions to these problems than a reliance on technical remedies
devised for other purposes. The Louisiana Civil Code and La. R.S.
9:3551 contain methods by which courts can seek to remedy the ine-
qualities inherent in adhesion contracts.
A more effective way to treat contracts of adhesion, however,
would be to enact a new provision containing both the flexibility of
La. R.S. 9:3551 and the scope of a codal article. The new provision
should allow for judicial discretion in the treatment of one-sided
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clauses rather than specifying strict adherence to form. In this way,
the circumstances in each case could be reasonably evaluated to de-
termine the properly applicable remedy.
